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ABSTRACT
This comment extends Calvo's ( 1988) analysis of the relation between expectations and the
number of repudiation equilibria in public debt management, in order to anaIyse the effects of
heterogeneity in (nominal) debt holdings. It is shown that the number of equilibria depends on the
relative wealth of the agent represented by the govemment. If this agent is extremely poor no
equilibrium exists, while if this agent is relatively wealthy uniqueness is ensured. Under a
representative democracy, if the issue of debt precedes the elections, the number of politico-
economic equilibria and the implied welfare losses depend on the degree of inequality. However,
if this timing is reversed, the Pareto-optimum is attained, because of the existence of a
government candidate whose unique equilibrium discretionary policy choice is the first-best
repudiation rate.
Version: lune 1994.
' Helpful comments and suggestions by Rob Alessie, Lans Bovenberg, Alex Cukietman, Harry
Huizinga, Arianne van der Klugt, Rick van der Plceg and Peter Schotman aze gratefully
acknowledged. All remaining errors are my sole responsibility.1
In an interesting contribution, Calvo (1988) analyses the role of expectations in the multiplicity of
equilibria that might arise in public debt management. In a"good" equilibrium the interest rate on
government debt is low because investors expect little or no debt tepudiation, and indeed, given
the relatively low debt service costs, ex post the government has less of an incentive for
repudiation. Conversely, in a"bad" equilibrium, expectations of future repudiation imply higher
debt service costs, which lead to stronger incentives for repudiation, thereby fulfilling the
expectations of investors.
The issue of multiplicity has been analysed further in related models of Giavazzi and
Pagano (1989) and Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1989). The general finding is that a contidence
crisis in public debt management is less likely if the average maturity of debt is longer, rall-over
of the outstanding stock of debt is more evenly smoothed out over time and if the government has
better access to foreign credit lines in the event of a debt panic. Although Calvo points out that
there could be important redistributive effects of debt repudiation, so far no systematic analysis
has linked the problem of multiple equilibria to the distribution of debt holdings among investors
and the potentially resulting political conflict.
Below, Calvo's analysis is extended to allow for heterogeneity in nominal asset holdings
(e.g., private and public debQ among private agents. Agents with different relative wealth prefer a
different composition of government revenues for a given Ievel of public expenses. Some agents
hold a lot of debt, hence prefer lit[le or no repudiation' of debt, while others are poor and prefer
repudiation rather than taxation.
Although data on the inequality in nominal asset holdings are rare, which is in particular
the case for comparable cross-country data, the figures in, for example, Smith (1988) show that
the shares in total bonds and cash holdings by the richest one percent of the U.S. population are
typically in the range of 100~ to 30~ or even higher. Similar figures in Avery, Elliehausen and
Kennickel (1988) from the 1983 Survey of Constuner Finances suggest that only less than 50~ of
nominal wealth is held by the poorer 90k of U.S. households. The few available data for other
(industrialised) countries (for example, France) suggest degrees of inequality of compazable
magnitude.
The extension of Calvo's model advanced below shows that the ntunber of equilibria
depends on the relative wealth of the agent represented by the government. If this agent is very
' As in Calvo, "repudiation" is a catchall word here, which refers to anything from open repudiation to
an inflation tax on the gross rate of return on nominal debt. The analysis in this wtnment is mostly
concerncd with the latter form of repudiation.2
poor, no equilibrium exists, because the incentive of the government to redistribute through a high
rate of inflation is too strong for agents to be willing to hold debt, while if the agent represented
is relatively wealthy, uniqueness of equilibrium is ensured. Therefore, in a reptesentative
democracy where the issue of debt precedes the elections, the number of equilibria and their
implied welfare losses depend on the degree of inequality among the electorate. Crucially,
however, it can be shown that there exists a unique type of government candidate whose unique
discretionary equilibrium policy choice is the Pareto optimal inflation rate. Hence, if elections
precede the issue of debt, the Pareto optimutn is attained. The electorate's perspective is altered in
such a way that they do not only take into account the set of alternative policy outcomes, but a
wider set of characteristics of the equilibrium on which the economy settles. In particular, the
electorate takes into account the effects of their voting behaviour on inflationary expectations as an
important determinant of the ex post optimal inflation rate. From a more general point of view,
these findings stress the importance of an appropriate timing in the management of (public) debt
and the scheduling of elections.
Including international debt in the analysis leaves most of the results unaffected, although,
if elections are introduced which follow the issue of debt, the chosen government represents a
poorer agent and has a stronger incentive for inflation than before. This makes the existence of an
equilibrium in which agents are prepared to hold a given amount of public debt less likely.
However, when elections are appropriately scheduled, the economy still attains its Pareto
optimum.
The remainder of this comment is organised as follows. Section I extends Calvo's model
to allow fot heterogeneity in nominal debt holdings. Section [I analyses the existence and number
of equilibria if the government represents agents with different levels of wealth, while Section III
introduces a representative democracy with elections. Section IV includes intemational debt into
the analysis. Section V concludes this cornment.
I. Heterogeneous Debt Holdings
This section extends Calvo's monetary model of non-indexed public debt management (Section lI
of his article) to allow for heterogeneity in nominal debt holdings among private sector agents (cf.
Beetsma and Van der Ploeg, 1993). Although data on the distribution of nominal asset holdings
are rare, in particular comparable ctoss-country data, recent work of, for example, Smith (1988)
and Avery, Elliehausen and Kennickel (1988) on U.S. microdata suggests that the distributions of
these asset holdings are extremely skewed. For example, the richest (in terms of total net worth)3
percent of the population has a share in the range of at least ]045 to more than 30~ (depending
on the item and the period) in total nominal asset value holdings by the population. 5imilar figures
are reported for France (Kessler and Wolff, 1991) and lapan (Bauer and Mason, 1992). Other
typical characteristics of such data are the strong correlations among the distributions of various
wealth items (i.e., the rich members of the populatíon not only hold large shares of nominal
wealth, but also of corporate stock, real estate, etcetera), as well as the correlation between the
distribution of income and wealth. Roughly speaking, the highest income earners are also [he most
wealthy in the population. The income distribution, howevet, is generally much less skewed than
the wealth distribution (Bauer and Mason, 1992). These observations suggest that a potentially
important further step in the analysis of the role of expectations in (public) debt tnanagement
would be to allow for heterogeneity in nominal asset holdings, which, in particular, makes it
possible to analyse the effects of political pressures for redisttibution.
A few qualifications are in order. First, it is assumed that (private and public) debt is in
nominal terms, rather than indexed to the price IeveL On the one hand this can be motivated by
the fact that in reality most of the debt, both public and private, is in nominal terms, at least in
industrialised countries. On the other hand, the version of Calvo's model with real debt
repudiation (Section 1 of his article) can be extended in a way very similar to the extension below,
by allowing for heterogeneity in holdings of indexed debt and a government which chooses a
degree of repudiation which depends on Ihe relative wealth of the agent it represents. The second
point is that, ideally, one would like to allow for other types of inequality as well. However, as
the remainder of the analysis makes clear, this would add a great deal of additional complexity to
the model. This is in particular the case when elections aze introduced (as in Section III), since the
conditions for a stable majority are notoriously restrictive if there is more than one source of
conflict (inequality) among voters (although, as noticed above, the available data suggest that the
various wealth items are highly concentrated with the same groups in the popula[ion). Finally, we
should address the observation that usually large amounts of nominal debt are held by institutional
investors. To keep the analysis focussed we abstract from the existence of such investots which do
not exert direct political influence via the electoral process anyway. Also, in reality, a high rate of
inflation might have a significant indirect effect on the wealth of those who hold large amounts of
stock in institutional investment companies.
There are two periods, period 0 and period 1, and two types of agents: private sector agents and
the government. In period 0, nominal debt is issued both by private agents and the government,
while in period 1 the debt is paid off. All debt is assumed to be perfectly substitutable and, hence,4
has the same nominal interest factor Rb~ 1 ti (where i is the nominal interest ra[e). Although in
period 1 the value of debt is fixed in nominal terms, its real value depends on the rate of inflation
between period 0 and period 1. If we denote by P, the price level in period t(t-0,1), the real
interest factor on debt is R,,PdP,. Therefore, we interpret B-1-PoIP, as the share of debt that is
"repudiated" through inflation. The inflation rate, r-(P,-P„)IPo, which is assumed to be under
direct control of the government2, is uniquely related to the "repudiation rate", B. Since -
1 5aG oo ,-oo G B G 1. Following Calvo, the demand for real money balances is assttmed to be
constant, hence M,IP,-K~O, where M, is the (demand determined) nominal money supply.
Private agents have the possibility to accumulate physical capital, with an exogenous gross
real interest factor R 1 I, or to invest in (or issue) nominal bonds. In a perfect foresight
equilibrium with positive stocks of capital and outstanding debt (private or public), individuals are
indifferent between the two types of assets, which requires
(1-b) Rb - R. (1.1)
In period 0, private agents differ in their available resources for investment. In particular, under
the assumption that each individual invests the same amount, k, in capital, and that individuals do
not differ in other respects, the private sector is modelled as a continutun of agents, who are
distributed on R according to their individual total (private and public) deb[ holdings. The
aggregate mass of private agents is normalised to unity.
Individuals consume all of their wealth in period 1. Constunption of an individual with
debt holdings b(henceforth, "agent b" or an agent of "type b") is
d- y- z(x) t kR f( 1-B)bRb - x - KB - v(B), (1.2)
where y is (exogenous) endowment income, kR is the gross real teturn on investment in physical
capital, (I-B)bRh is the net real return on debt holdings, x denotes the tax payment and KB-(M,-
M„)IP, the amount of seigniorage paid. Function z(x) represents the "deadweight" cost of taxation
and has properties z(0)-z'(0)-0 and z"(x)~0. Distortionary losses due to inFlation are given by
v(B) wi[h analogous properties v(0)-d(0)-0 and v"(B)10. Thus, ittflation is reflected in a direct
welfare cost for agents.
~ This corresponds to a situation in which the central bank is dependent. Although recently a number of
countries have tried to make their central banks less dependent, in practice it turns out that no central bank
is complctely immunc for political pressures, not even the Bundesbank (wimess the course of events around
the German unifica[ion).5
Taxes, x, follow from the per capita government budget constraint in period 1,
x - (1-B)b"Rb f g - KB, (1.3)
where b" is the per capita or average amount of government debt issued in period 0 and g is the
exogenous level of goverrtment spending. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we focus on the more
realistic case where b" is non-negative. Higher inflation, hence a higher B, lowers real debt
service costs and raises seigniorage revenues, KB, and, therefore, requires less tax revenues. In the
special case where b"-0, the net indebtedness of the government is zero and there is no outside
debt. All private nominal claims cancel out in the aggregate.
II. Government type and existence of equilíbria
Equilibrium consumption of an arbitrary agent b follows upon substitution of the government
budget constraint (1.3) and arbi[rage condition (1.1) into (1.2):
e- Y t Ikf(b-b")1R - 8- z(Rb"fg-KB) - v(8), (2.1)
where the term (b-b")R captures the higher (lower) than average consumption possibilities of agent
bifbl(c)b".
ll.l Pareto-optima! equi[ibrium
In equilibrium, consumption only depends on the sum of distortionary losses from taxation and
inflation, which are equal for all agents. Therefore, the Pareto-optimal or "first-best" equilibrium
corresponds to the minimisation of total distortionary losses T(B)-z(Rb"tg-KB)fv(B). Because
T"(B)~0 and excluding the corner solution 8-1, which is ensured if d(1)~z'(Rb"tg-K)x, the
repudiation share B'" in a first-best equilibrium follows from
K z'(Rb"fg-KB~) - d(B~). (2.2)
Note that 0 5B''v c(Rb"fg)iK and that B~ increases in the level of government commitments,
Rb"fg. Since T"(B) ~ 0, T'(B) G0 for B G BFB, and T'(B)10 for B C B~. An increase in B reduces,
on the one hand, the rea] value of money holdings, thereby lowering the required amount of tax
revenues, and hence implies lower distortionary losses from taxation, while, on the other hand, it6
increases the distortionary losses associated with inflation. Therefore, (2.2) says that at B-B'ro the
marginal henefit from an increase in B equals its marginal cost.
II.2 Discretionary equilibria
Suppose that the government in period 1 represents agent b' and is not constrained by any
commitments. The government objective funetion, y-z((1-B)b"Rbfg-rcB)fkRf(1-B)(b-b")Rb-g-v(B),
which follows upon substitution of (1.3) into (1.2), is strictly concave in B on (-ao,l]. Therefore,
if b~bm;,,(Rh)-(b"R,;v`(1)fz'(g-K)]tKb, the unique optimal choice, rY"-~ 1("SB" for "secor~d-
best"), solves:
-z'((1-B)b"Rbfg-KB) (b"RstK) f d(B) t (ts-b")Rb - 0. (2.3)
Hence, some function rb exists, such that,
BsB - ~(b",Rn,g,b"-b), (2.4)
where, as follows from the implicit function theorem, a~lag~ 0 and a~la(b"-b) ~0 (the signs of
the other partials depend on the sign of b"-b). Given average debt holdings, the poorer the agent
represented 6y the government, the higher the rate of inflation. This reflects the incentive to use
inflation as a device for redistribution once the value of debt has been fixed in nominal terms.
Obviously, if b-b" this incentive vanishes and the problem of the govertunent reduces to the one
analysed by Calvo.
A pair {B,Rn}, BG I, is an equilibrium combination if and only if it jointly fulfills (1.1)
and (2.3). Substituting R,,- RI(1-B) into (2.3) and rearranging yields:
bR - z'(Rb"fg-KB)(Rb"tK(1-B)} -(I-B)d(B) f Rb", Bc L (2.5)
The following lemma summarises the relation between the number of equilibria and the relative
wealth of the agent represented by the government:
Lemma l: Let b" be given.
(a) A level of debt holdings b,.ER exists, such that, if the government represents an agent
poorer than b~, no equilibrium exists (with per capita amount of public debt equal to b").
' I.e., this government chooses B to maximise wnsumption of agent b. Such government is said to be of
"type b" or is simply referred to as "government b".7
(b) A level of debt holdings b" E R exists, such that, if the government represents an agent
richer than b", a unique equilibritun exists.
(c) The government type (b''B, say) compatible with B-B~ as an equilibrium discretionary
policy choice is unique. Vice versa, if the government type is b~, its equilibrium
discretionary policy choice is unique and given by B-BFe.
Proof: (a) Differentiating the right hand side (LHS) of (2.5) with respect to B, yields that the RHS
of (2.5) is decreasing for B50 and ïncreasïng for B?max[1,ifRb"iK,(Rb"-t-g)IK]. i3y continuity,
it follows that the RHS of (2.5) is bounded from below for BG 1. (b) The RHS of (2.5) is
bounded from above on the interval (0,1). Moreover, it is strictly decreasing for B50 and its limit
is ~, as 8-~-~. (c) An eyuilibrium where BSB-B~ requires that (2.5) be fulfilled for B-B~.
Rearranging and using (2.2), it follows immediately that b is uniquely given by
b~ - b" f z'(Rb" fg-KBFB) b". (2.6)
Tu prove the reverse part of (c), substitute (2.6) for b into (2.5), rearrange and use -z'(Rb"tg-
KB)KfV'(B)-T'(B), so that,
(1-B) T'(B) - [z'(Rb"tg-KB) - z'(Rb"fg-KB~)] Rb". (2.7)
It follows from the properties of T(B) and z(.) that (2.7) is fulfilled if B-B~, tha[ the LHS of (2.7)
is negative while the RHS is positive if B C BFB and vice versa if BFBG BG 1. Hence, for
government b''e the discretionary equilibrium policy choice is uniquely given by BFB. o
According to Lernma 1(a), no equilibrium exists if the government represents a sufficiently poor
agent and plans to issue a per capita amount of debt b". If the government represents such a poor
agent, once this amount of public debt has been issued, the incentives for redistribution are so
strong that the government chooses to completely inflate away the real value of any outstanding
nominal debt (both public and private). No investor who anticipates this would be willing to hold
any debt. However, note that if b" 1(K-g)IR, the RHS of (2.5) is increasing in b" for all B G 1.
Therefore, given such a govertunent, it is not excluded that there may exist equilibria in which a
smaller amount of public debt is issued. Lernma 1(b) says that if the agent represented is rich
enough, a unique eyuilibrium exists. With respect Lemma I(c), note that b`B~b" (if b"~0), i.e.
the goverrtment compatible with B~ as its equilibrium discretionary policy choice is more8
"conservative" than the average voter." Although a government of type b" 10 has no incentive to
redistribute, it still has an incentive to inflate away part of the real value of government debt, once
debt service costs are fixed in nominal terms. Given that in equilibrium these attempts to
redistribute are futile, the government type which is prepared to implement the first-best inflation
rate should be more conservative than the average agent b".
For a more detailed assessment of the number of equilibria, we discuss two special cases:
No demandfor rnoney (K-0):
In a first-best situation, the only way distortionary losses from taxation can be reduced is through
increased seigniorage revenues. If K-O, this channel vanishes, however, and the inflation rate
which minimises distortionary losses corresponds to B''8-0. Discretionary equilibria correspond to
solutions of:
(b"-b) t z'(Rb"tg) Rb" -(1-B)v'(B), Bc 1. (2.8)
The RHS of (2.8) is increasing for 850, decreasing for Bzl, equals zero if B-0 or 8-1, and is
strictly greater than zero for 0G Bc 1. Hence, the RHS of (2.8) reaches a global maximum on the
interval (0,1). It follows immediately that:
Lemma 2: Let b" be given, K-0 and the govemment represent agent b. Define b~ as the minimum
value of b for which (2.8) has a solution B G 1.
(a) If bG b,,, no equilibrium exists (with an amount of public debt b").
(b) If b-b~, at least one equilibrium exists.
(c) If b,.G bc brB, more than one equilibrium exists.
(d) If b? b' ", a unique equilibrium exists.
Compared with Lemma 1, Lemma 2 presents a more detaíled assessmen[ of the role of the
government type in the number of equilibria. In particular, if the govermnent is not too "radical",
so that it represents a"middle class" agent (b~GbGb`'e), a multiplicity of equilibria exists.
Moreover, note that, however poor the agent represented, there always exists an amotmt of public
debt (maybe negative, in which case the government is a net creditor) compatible with the
' A related result was pointed out by Rogoff (1985) in the context of the appointment of a central
banker with stronger anti-inflationary preferences than the representative member of society. Persson and
Tabellini ( 1990) discuss similar findings in various contexts.9
existence of an equilibrium.
No public debt (b" -0):
Even though the stock of outstanding government debt is zero, nominal debt holdings need not be
equal among private sector agents, due to claims of private agents against each other. If b"-0,
(2.6) reduces to b`'"-b"-o. The average goverrunent type (b~-b"-0) has no other incentive for
inflation than to balance revenues from taxation and inflation in such a way that total distortionary
iosses are minimised. Discretionary equilibria correspond [o solutïons oi
bR - (1-B)[z'(g-KB)K-v'(B)] - -(1-B)T'(B), B G 1. (2.9)
If v'( I)1 z'(g-K)K (a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a first-best equilibrium
policy B''"G l), the RHS of (2.9) is strictly decreasing for BSB~ and strictly increasing at 8-1.
Hence, the RHS of (2.9) reaches its global minimum at some BE(B~,1), which corresponds to
some goverttment of type bc. Moreover, the RHS of (2.9) equals zero for B-B~ and 8-1, and is
negative for BE(B'B,l). Analogous to Lemma 2, it follows that
Lemma 3: Let b"-0, v'(1)1 z'(g-K)K and the government represent agent b. Define b~ (G0) as the
minimum value of b for which (2.9) has a solution BG 1.
(a) If bGbi,, no equilibrium exists.
(b) [f b-b~, at least one equilibrium exists.
(c) If b~ Gb G b~, a multiplicity of equilibria exists.
(d) If b?b'`B(-0), a unique equilibrium exists.
As already pointed out by Calvo, if b"-0 and the govemment represents b"-0-b~, the
equilibrium will be unique, because B~ does not depend on Rb in (2.3), and B~-B~. If b~b",
however, dependence of B'" on Rb is reintroduced via the third term on the LHS of (2.3), which
causes a potential for multiple equilibria. As in the case of zero money holdings (K-0), if the
government represents an "middle class" agent (i.e., b~GbGbF"), a multiplicity of equilibria
exists.
III. Representative Democracy, Timing and Inequality
Consider a political system with elections, where for each possible type of agent bER a10
government candidate of the same type ezists. [t is assumed that no candidate is able to precommit
to announcements of his future policies. The elected government type is determined by majority
rule.
Politico-economic eyuilihria can be found by solving backwards. The final decision, the
choice of B, given R,, and the new government's type, has been discussed in Section II. As will
become clear, it is of interest to consider the following alternative timings:
IJI. J Debt issue preiedes electiau
Consumption of an agent b, if a government of type b' is in power, is
c' - Y- z(g-K) t kR - g- v(1), if b' S bm„,(Rn),
d' - Y- z((I-B')b"R~,fg-KB') f kR -f (1-B')(b-b")Rn - g- v(B~), b' ~bmn(~,
(3.1)
where B' is the value of B chosen by goverrtment b'. It is easy to establish that: a~'l8b'-0, if
b' G b,,,~,(R,,); using (2.4), a~'Idb'10 if bm~(Rb)G b' G b, aè'l8b' -0 if b' -b, and 8~'Jt3b' G 0 if
b'~max[bm~(R,,),bJ; c' is continuous at b'-b,,,~(R,,). Hence, if bM~[b"R,,-d(I)tz'(g-K)]IRb, the
only type of candidate which cannot be defeated by an alternative in a majority voting contest is
bM, where bM is the median level of debt holdings. Therefore, irrespective of [he nominal interest
factor, the candidate of [ype bM is elected5. His policy choice B-BM follows from (2.3) by
replacing b with bM.b Policy outcomes in politico-economic equilibria correspond to solutions
B-BM.E Of
bMR - z'(Rb"-~g-KB)(Rb"fK(1-B)) -(1-B)v'(B) t Rb", BG 1. (3.2)
The most interesting results with respect to politico-economic equilibria and their existence are
summarised by:
Lemma 4: Assume that the issue of debt precedes the elections.
(a) If inedian debt holdings are less than or equal to average debt holdings (bM 5 b" ~0), any
' Although the type of the elec[ed candidate does not depend on Re, his choice of B, hettce also welfare,
do depend on Rh.
" If bMS~b"Ród(1)tz'(g-K)~IRb, all agents of type bsb" are indifferent among any of the candidates
of type b5(b"Rév'(1)tz'(g-x)~IRb. Therefore, the elected government is some arbitrary candidate from this
set and this candidate chooses 8-1. Equilibria with B- I do not exist, however. Hence, in situations where
a politico-economic equilibrium exists, the goverrunent always represents the rnedian debt holder(s).II
politico-economic equilibrium repudiation rate B"'" exceeds B1e.
(b) Given b", there is a upper bound on b"-bM above which no politico-economic equilibritun
exists.
(c) Given the degree of inequality (as measured by b"-bM ~ 0), there is an interval [(b")', ~),
(b")~z(1, for the level of public debt such that no politico-economic equilibrium exists.
Proof. (a) Follows by combining (3.2) with the properties of total distortionary costs T(B) and the
properties of z(Rb"tg-Kbj. (b) foHows immediately from Lemma 1(a). (c) Rewrite (3.2) as
R(b"-bM) f z'(Rb"fg-KB)[Rb"fK(1-B)J -( t-B)v'(B), BG I. (3.3)
Fix (b"-bM). If b" 1 max((K-g)~R,O], one has that the partial derivative of the LHS of (3.3) with
respect to b" is greater than and bounded away from zero for all BG l, that the partial derivative
of the LHS of (3.3) with respect to B is less than zero for all Bc 1, and that z'(Rb"fg)Rb"20.
Combining this with the property that the RHS of (3.3) increases in B for BGO, gives the desired
result. ;~
Lemma 4(a) implies that a representative democracy in which the issue of debt precedes the
elections leads to welfare losses in equilibrium. Furthermore, depending on the degree of
inequality, there is a possibility for zero, a unique or multiple politico-economic equilibria.
Lemma 4(b) says [hat if inequality, as measured by b"-bM~O, is too high, i[ is optimal for
government bM to inflate the real value of debt away completely. In that case no equilibrium exists
in which the private sector is prepared to hold an average amount of public debt equal to b".
Finally, according to Lemma 4(c), there is always a limit to the amount of public debt that can be
issued. If the amount of debt the government plans to issue is too large, then nobody would be
willing to buy any deb[ for fear of being "expropriated" completely.
I11.2 Elections precede debt issue
An alternative timing changes the perspective of agents at the elections and, hence, influences
their voting behaviour. The implication is that:
Proposition l: If elections precede the issue of debt, the elected candidate is bB, and the first-best
equilibrium is attained.12
Proof. Recall from Lernma 1(c) that b~ is the unique govertunent candidate whose unique
discretionary equilibrium policy choice is 8-6~. Moreover, from the ex arue viewpoint at election
date, each agent's preferred equilibrium is that in which total distortionary losses aze minimised. [t
follows that, for each individual agent, b~ is the preferred government type. a
If the debt issue comes first, then, at the moment elections take place, the nominal interest factor
is given and, in particular, does not depend on the policy choices of the govemment to be elected.
Therefore, poor agents prefer a government which engages in a high inflation policy, so that the
tax rate can be lowered and the rich are forced to contribute a larger share of the revenues
reyuired by the government. However, if the issue of debt takes place after the elections, then, at
the moment of the elections, voters take into account that in equilibrium redistribution will not be
possible. The reason is that the nominal rate of return demanded by investors is detetmined only
when debt is issued and adjusts to the anticipated ex post inflationary incentives which depend on
the new government's type. If elections take place before debt is issued, at election date
inFlationary expectations still have to be incorporated in the nominal interest rate. Hence, the
electorate takes into account the effects of their voting behaviour on inflationary expectations. The
perspective of the electorate is altered such that each voter prefers a government type compatible
with a discretionary equilibrium in which total distortionary losses are minimised.
IV. Extension: Intemational Debt
There are two major ways of issuing debt to foreigners: issuing debt denominated in domestic
currency or debt denominated in some foreign currency. The fotmer type of debt is more
important for the rich and industrialised democratic countries and its role is studied below in a
further extension of the monetary modeL Issuing debt denominated in dollars is an important way
of attracting funds for Latin American countries. Although the real value of this type of debt is
protected against a high domestic inflation rate, it might still become victim of repudiation (recall
the example of Mexico, 1982, which announced to no longer honour its foreign debt). Therefore,
the introduction of debt denominated in foreign currency may be studied within the context of an
analogous extension of the real debt repudiation model of Calvo (1988, Section I).
The analysis with intetnational debt included largely parallels the analysis in previous sections and
is therefore kept short and confined to ceteris paribus changes of the resul[s. In other words, given
everything else, the yuestion is what happens if the amount of debt issued to foreigners is13
increased.
As befbre, let b" be the per capita' level uf public debt. Now, we assume that
b" -b"" t b' , where b"" and b'"? 0 denote the per capita domestic, respectively foreign, holdings
of public debt issued by the domestic authorities. Keeping b" and the available resources for
private sector agents' investments fixed, an agent who originally invested an amount b in nominal
claims, now invests an amount b"-b-b'' in nominal claims and an amount (kfb'') in physical
capital. As tax payments are still given by (1.3), his period 1 consumption becomes,
c- Y- z[(I-B)b"R,tg-KB] t(ktbr)R t(l-B)[b-(b`fb")]Rh - g- v(B). (4.1)
Combining (4.1) with (I.I) shows that the first-best repudiation rate B''e remains unchanged,
which is not surprising given that the government budget constraint (1.3) is unaffected by the
introduction of international debt. It is easy to see that all results summarised in I,emma's 1-3
(Section II) continue to hold. In particular, the government type which implements B'~ as its
unique discretionary equilibrium policy is still uniquely given by bF"-b"tz'(Rb"tg-K9F~B)b".
However, a ceteris paribus increase in b`' implies that b'N becomes "more conservative" relative to
an agent with average debt holdings bD". The intuition is that the lazger the amount of debt held
by foreigners, the stronger the temptation of a government which represents the average domestic
debt holder, bD", to use inflation to reduce the real value of the debt. The negative effect of the
higher inFlation rate on the real value of the average agent's debt holdings is more than offset by
the reduction in his tax payments. Hence, to compensate for the stronger incentive for inflation,
b'B should be relatively more conservative.
Consider the introduction of elections (as in Section III) which take place after all debt has
been issued. Going through the same steps as in Section III.1, one finds again that the chosen
government represents the median debt holder. Now, however, the median amount of debt
holdings equals bDM-bM-bP ~d, hence, the agent represented in any politit.o-economic
equilibrium is poorer (in terms of nominal asset holdings) than when no debt is issued to
foreigners. Equilibrium policy outcomes correspond to solutions B-BM~E of
b"MR -(bM-b'')R - z'(Rb"-~g-KB)(Rb"fK(1-B)) -(1-B)v'(B) f Rb", Bc 1. (4.2)
The results of Lemma 4 continue to hold. Hence, if inedian debt holdings, bDM, are less than or
' The term "per capita' denotes an amount per individual in the dotnestic private sector. Remember that
the number of domestic private agents was normalised to unity.)a
equal to the per capita level of public debt, b", any equilibrium repudiation rate B"'~E ezceeds the
the first-best repudiation rate. Moreover, provided that (4.2) has at least a single solution BG 1,
the lowest eyuilibrium repudiation rate increases with a ceteris paribus increase in the amount of
debt issued to foreigners". Therefore, if there were some way to coordinate expectations towards
the equilibrium with the lowest repudiation rate, a ceteris paribus decrease in the amount of debt
sold to foreigners would lead to a Pareto improvement. Finally, for a given per capita level of
public debt, b", the limiting degree of inequality, b""-b"M-b"-bM, compatible with the ezistence
of an equilibrium faiis with an increase in b`.
The final step of this extension is to consider the alternative timing where elections
precede the issue of debt. As noted above, bFB still is the unique government type which has B~ as
its unique discretionary equilibrium policy choice. (ience, the results of Proposition 1 apply, so
that, irrespective of the amourtt of debt that is sold to foreigners, the economy attains theftrst-best
if elections are appropriatelyscheduled vis-à-vis the issue of debt.
V. Conclusion
The monetary version of Calvo's (1988) debt repudiation model has been extended to a context
with heterogeneity in debt holdings among the private sector. An unequal distribution of debt
holdings may provide an additional incentive for a government which represents the poor to
redistribute by inflating away (part of) the real debt value. Therefore, the degree of inequality
plays an important role in the possible number of equilibria. Moreover, if elections are
introduced, their timing relative vis-à-vis the issue of debt is important. If elections precede the
issue of debt, voters are induced to take account of a wider set of aspects (in particulaz, the level
of inflationary expectations and its effects on nominal interest rates) of any potentially resulting
equilibrium. This might lead to Pareto improvements and reduce the need for debt indexation as a
way to attain the first best (see Calvo). The latter could have other advantages, since indexation
against inflation might convey the wrong signals about the goverttment's anti-inflationary
preferences or distort the incentives of the government in other ways not modeled here (see
Fischer and Summers, 1989).
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